The Missing Piece in the Peace Process

The Connolly Association pamphlet The Missing Piece in the Peace Process by Ken Keable has now gone into its second edition, with updates and revisions. Chapter 10 is posted below, followed by remarks added to the introduction for the second edition, published in June 2004.

The 52-page pamphlet is available from Four Provinces Bookshop, 244 Gray’s Inn Road, London WC1X 8JR. It costs £3.00, plus 40p for postage (UK) or 85p (Europe) or £1.25 (USA). Phone (00 44) 207 833 3022 (open 11am to 4pm, Wednesday to Saturday).

THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT AND THE WAY FORWARD

ON FRIDAY 10th April 1998 all parties taking part in multi-party talks at Stormont (including both governments) arrived at the Belfast (or Good Friday) Agreement. This was ratified in a referendum in Northern Ireland on 22 May, when 71% voted for the Agreement, 29% against, in a high turnout of 81%. It is estimated that, of those who voted, perhaps as many as 96% of nationalists voted Yes and that between 51 and 53 % of unionists voted Yes. In the Republic, on the same day, a referendum was held to give the government the authority to amend clauses 2 and 3 of the Republic’s constitution, as required by the Agreement, when it judged that Britain had fulfilled its promises. (This has since been done). Voting in the Republic was: Yes 94.4%, No 5.6%, on a low turnout of 56%.

The Agreement is well worth studying in detail. It can be obtained from HMSO or viewed on several websites, notably HYPERLINK "http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/index.html or http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/index.html .

The Agreement acknowledges the right of the people of Ireland, North and South, to self-determination and makes provision for that right to be exercised, without external impediment, but only by separate and concurrent referenda in the two jurisdictions. Thus it enshrines the principle of the unionist veto, so long as the unionists remain a majority in Northern Ireland. It legally underpins human rights including freedom from discrimination on sectarian and other grounds, as well of parity of esteem for the two traditions. It makes it legal for nationalists to campaign peacefully for a united Ireland, and for unionists to campaign for their position. It commits all parties and both governments to accept that Northern Ireland will remain in the UK until a majority in the territory vote otherwise. It commits all parties to use exclusively peaceful means.

In accordance with the Agreement, Parliament has passed the Northern Ireland Act 1998 that repeals and replaces the Government of Ireland Act 1920.

Articles 2 and 3 of the Republic’s constitution have been changed in accordance with the Agreement, and the new version includes the following words:

“It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite all the people who share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the diversity of their identities and traditions, recognising that a united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions in the island.”

Thus the Republic’s territorial claim has been replaced by an aspiration to a united Ireland. The new Articles also grant Irish citizenship to all Northern Ireland citizens who request it (a right already granted in Irish law but not previously included in the constitution).

“Strand One” of the Agreement provides for a 108-member Northern Ireland Assembly –six members from each of the 18 parliamentary constituencies, elected by proportional representation. The reason for the large size of the Assembly was to try to bring in every small group, giving them a vested interest in the peace process, and to make them talk to each other. Members are required to register a “designation of identity” – “nationalist”, “unionist” or “other”. To ensure that key decisions are taken on a cross-community basis, voting on them must be by either parallel consent, i.e. a majority of those members present and voting, including a majority of the unionist and nationalist designations present and voting; or a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, including at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist designations present and voting. The Assembly only has devolved powers. It elects an Executive, in which parties are allocated seats according to their strength in the Assembly. There are other complicated provisions to ensure that all parties have ministers and that matters can proceed only on a consensual, cross-community basis.

“Strand Two” provides for a North-South Ministerial Council with powers to promote all-Ireland co-operation on a wide range of matters including agriculture, education, transport, environment, waterways, health, tourism etc.

“Strand Three” provides for a British-Irish Council with representation from the two governments, the Northern Ireland Executive, the Welsh Assembly, the Scottish Parliament and from the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. It has vague powers to develop common policies on a range of issues like those listed in Strand Two. Strand Three also provides for a standing British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference. This will meet frequently at ministerial level at least, to review progress on the Agreement and discuss any relevant matters put before it by either government.

Because the parties recognised their inability to agree on the two most contentious issues, policing and the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, the Agreement “contracted out” these matters to two independent international commissions, the Patten Commission and the de Chastelain Commission. (Decommissioning, as a demand, was first invented by the Major government as a means to avoid responding to the IRA ceasefire of 31 August 1994.)

The Agreement also provides for the conditional release of prisoners, a review of the criminal justice system, a Victims Commissioner, an Equality Commission, a Human Rights Commission, and other matters.

In addition, the two governments agreed that whichever was, or became in the future, the sovereign government as a result of the declared wishes of the people of Northern Ireland, that government would respect the same principles of equality, human rights and parity of esteem for both traditions, and would respect the right of individuals to identify themselves as British or Irish, or both, and that their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship would not be affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland.

The Agreement allows only two options for the future status of the territory – there is no third option, such as repartition.

This Agreement creates a new political terrain. Even if it fails, it is still a great step forward and will be a benchmark for whatever follows. It is only a transitional, not a final settlement. It is unique and bizarre – it has been said that only the Dayton Accord for Boznia-Herzogovina comes near it. It provides for the possibility of a united Ireland – indeed it provides a road map to it and establishes much of the basis of an agreement for such a transition – but it does not provide for anything like a normal liberal democracy in Northern Ireland while partition remains. It makes a return to the Stormont regime impossible, as it is designed to prevent majority rule within Northern Ireland. It gives very limited, devolved political power (and lots of jobs and salaries) to politicians of both traditions, but only if they work together on a cross-community basis. It makes a peaceful campaign for a united Ireland possible. To the extent that it convinces Irish republicans that it does offer a peaceful way towards a united Ireland, it will help the political, non-militarist wing of republicanism to defeat the militarist wing.

If the unionists were to pull out of the Assembly, or renounce the Agreement entirely, it is hard to imagine that the government would abolish the Equality Commission, the Human Rights Commission, the anti-discrimination laws, the police reforms or the criminal justice review, and certainly not the Intergovernmental Conference. Other bodies might also remain. So enormous irreversible strides would have been made which lay the basis for dismantling sectarian practices. It is difficult to see where the unionists could go from such a situation, (other than back in) and their politicians might lose their salaried positions. It would also cause more fragmentation in the unionist camp.

The most important thing the Agreement does is to offer a way to the gradual elimination of sectarian ideology, by eliminating its material basis, which is sectarian discrimination. The practical advantages of all-Ireland co-operation are so many and obvious that, if sectarianism diminishes significantly, unionism will seem increasingly irrelevant. This is the more so since, in the Agreement, if a united Ireland occurs, all Northern Ireland people will be able to retain their British citizenship if they so wish. In addition, the fact that both Britain and Ireland are members of the EU means that the practical significance of whether a person is in one state or the other is being gradually reduced.

The Patten Commission on policing comprised an international, independent panel of world-class experts on the relevant aspects of policing, which conducted extensive investigations and heard evidence from the public at meetings all over Northern Ireland. Since the Commission itself represented a compromise for both sides in Northern Ireland, the sensible and obvious course for the government would have been to implement the Commission’s recommendations in full. Changes could still have been made later in the light of experience. Instead, the government conceded to unionist pressure and watered down these proposals when drafting the legislation. This decision has created huge problems for the Sinn Féin leadership in trying to persuade their followers to accept decommissioning and to bring an end to IRA punishment beatings (a form of unofficial policing of nationalist ghettoes). It was a fatal error.

The referenda that followed the Agreement have been presented as an expression of national self-determination. The falsity of this idea was exposed when, in February 2000, the Northern Ireland Secretary, Peter Mandelson, suspended the main institutions set up under the Agreement, against the wishes of the nationalist parties and of the Irish government. In addition, the referenda were not free of outside interference, because Britain was in the negotiations from a position of overwhelming power. By guaranteeing the position of the unionists, who are a minority in Ireland, Britain made itself responsible for the situation, as it has always been. This Agreement therefore does not, in my view, make Northern Ireland a legitimate political entity. It merely confirms that it has been a failure up to now and that it cannot function normally.

The “principle” of unionist consent has already been breached. The multi-party talks only reached agreement because Britain and the USA told the unionists in no uncertain terms that they could not have what they wanted if that meant a return to simple “majority” rule or a continuation of direct rule. Pressure on the Blair government by the USA was also a factor. So pressure from outside the territory was vital to the Agreement, and hence will be vital to its implementation. Until the unionists get new leaders who want to eliminate sectarianism, progress will only be possible if Britain faces down unionist intransigence and imposes its will on them. It did this when it imposed the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement in face of the “Ulster Says No!” campaign. It did it again during the multi-party talks leading to the Agreement. As long as it remains, by its own will, the sovereign power, it retains the responsibility to do so again.

Do the two referenda mean that British people who want British withdrawal should accept the unionist veto? Not as a matter of principle. Partition is against the interests of the British people. The unionist veto still means that less than 2% of the UK population can over-rule the rest, whatever the cost or consequences. The quotation by Winston Churchill at the front of this pamphlet is still relevant. The people of Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) have the right to national self-determination, and we can exercise it by making the dissolution of the union with Northern Ireland our government’s policy objective.

For many years now, opinion polls have shown that the majority of people in Britain want withdrawal from Northern Ireland. (In March 1988 The Sun invited its readers to vote, by telephone, for or against the British presence in Northern Ireland. Embarrassed news managers were forced to bury the news of the result on an inside page - it was 45,453 for pulling out, 10,450 for staying put.)

A Guardian/ICM opinion poll, published on 21st August 2001, confirmed the position. It showed that only 26% of people in Britain think that Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK, while 41% think that there should be a united Ireland. It is difficult to see why support for the Union should increase in the coming years, and it seems more likely to decrease, especially if “loyalists” are seen to be the cause of any continuing violence, and if those who favour British withdrawal make full use of the opportunity created by the IRA ceasefire to put their case in a calmer atmosphere.

The people of the Republic have said in a referendum that they don’t want a united Ireland without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. So for Britain to attempt to foist it on them would be to inflict further suffering on the Irish people. The Agreement should be given every possible support, and progress by consent is obviously to be preferred. The Agreement does not prevent any present or future British government from declaring withdrawal its policy objective, by seeking to persuade the unionist people to see a united Ireland in a more positive light, nor from using its power, including economic inducement, to make it more attractive. Indeed to make the government a "persuader" of the unionists was the policy of the Labour Party (in opposition) from 1988 for a number of years. Any such declaration would transform the atmosphere and make at least some unionists begin pragmatically to concentrate on securing the best deal possible for the transition. Such a change of government policy would stop the pandering to unionism which has always hindered progress, and which has dogged the implementation of the Agreement thus far.

If, over years, the implementation of the Agreement sufficiently erodes the sectarian culture that is at the root of unionism, then the “consent principle” may become an ally of British withdrawal instead of its enemy. In addition, if current demographic trends continue to the point when nationalists constitute a numerical majority in Northern Ireland, this will present a wholly new situation and a challenge to everyone’s thinking.

In the new post-Agreement situation, many new opportunities should arise, in Britain, to discuss the problem and highlight the issues. Despite the “Real IRA”, the atmosphere is now much more peaceful than it was. However, a crisis in Northern Ireland could occur at any time, or the opponents of progress in Britain could manufacture one when it suits them. Any period of relative peace should be seen as an opportunity, not to be missed, for explaining the underlying problems, and for putting pressure on the government to honour its commitments and even to go beyond them without bowing to unionist pressure.

If the process envisaged in the Agreement breaks down, progress will only be possible by very firm government pressure on the unionists. Pandering to unionism, as in the past, will only take us back into the quagmire. But it seems likely that there will always be some unionists who want to make the Agreement work, because it is holds the best hope of peace and because that is the only way that they can have a devolved government, giving them more say in how they are governed and some jobs for their politicians.

October and November 2001 showed two contradictory trends. First, loyalists tried to prevent children from attending the Holy Cross Catholic primary school in north Belfast. The children were then escorted to school for weeks by the police and Army, but there were very few arrests, despite the fact that the loyalist residents were clearly violating the law daily and in full public view. For its part the government apparently held back from making the law-enforcers enforce the law. This was the old, Curragh-mutiny approach of failing to stand up to the unionists no matter what they did. The second event was the opposite. When the pro-Agreement unionists couldn’t muster quite enough unionist votes in the Assembly to re-elect David Trimble as First Minister, Tony Blair personally urged the leader of the Alliance Party to re-designate some of his members as unionists in order to secure the re-election at the second attempt. The assorted anti-Agreement unionists were defeated by a united front of all the pro-Agreement forces, upholding the will of the Irish people as expressed in the referenda. This approach – a united front of all pro-Agreement forces - points the way forward for progress, democracy and peace. (The tactic itself was bizarre, but that is because the whole set-up is bizarre as befits the bizarre political entity that Northern Ireland is).

The emergence, in 2003, of Dr Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party as the largest unionist party does not, in principle, alter anything. Already the DUP has changed its language. Its leaders, below Paisley himself whom they have sidelined, are much more pragmatic and are very keen to get into office. They know that they can’t do this without sharing power with nationalists; it is just a question of the terms. The next elections to the Assembly are due in 2008 and there is no guarantee that the unionist voters will re-elect the DUP then if all they can offer is to continue saying “no” for a further 5 years. Also, the British government can’t afford to allow the Agreement to collapse completely. This would be a great humiliation and would leave the government without any policy at all on this highly embarrassing international problem. It would also strengthen the case for British withdrawal.

Britain should be generous to all the people of Northern Ireland; the unionist population are also victims of British colonialism. They have been used by the British Empire, the Tory Party, the armed forces, six-county landowners and employers, and all the most reactionary elements of British society, and they have suffered greatly.

In the eventual British withdrawal, the method of withdrawal, including the timetable, should be a matter for negotiation, not unilateral imposition. The aim should be an orderly hand-over of power to a new all-Ireland government, with the safeguards that have already been agreed. Britain should offer a substantial subsidy over many years to ease the process, in recognition of its responsibility for clearing up the mess that it has created.

I suggest that a British campaign for withdrawal should include the following:

• Support for the Good Friday Agreement and its implementation, especially campaigning for our government to fulfill its obligations.
• Pressure on the government to face down the anti-agreement unionists and unionist intransigence. Campaigning for the government to make withdrawal its policy objective, to be achieved by persuading and inducing the unionists to accept a united Ireland.
• Explaining the benefits for Britain of withdrawal.
• Support for anti-discrimination cases brought by individuals and groups. We can expect a great many of these, as people strive to turn their new legal rights into reality, against strong resistance. Trade unions could play a big part in this.
• Promotion of the study of the history of English and British colonialism in Ireland. Much of this has been distorted and obscured. Irish history illuminates British history and is part of it.
• A campaign for truth. There is a whole can of worms to be opened, especially about the activities of the secret services, collusion between British intelligence services and loyalist paramilitaries, Bloody Sunday, and the murders of Pat Finucane, Rosemary Nelson, Robert Hamill and others. This campaign will help to make Britain’s armed forces, secret services and government more accountable in the future.
• Internationalisation of the issue. Pressure on Britain from the USA, the EU and elsewhere have helped get us this far, and could help us further. This is quite a different matter from inviting outside interference in Britain’s internal affairs, as this is really an international problem.
• Resistance to anti-Irish racism in Britain, and support for the growing self-confidence and cultural expression of Britain’s Irish community.
• Promotion of more friendly and economic links between Britain and Ireland. The labour movement has a role to play in this, as well as the British-Irish Council.

Success for the campaign holds the prospect of a lasting peace, progress towards a more democratic Britain, and a strategic defeat for all the most reactionary forces in British society. A new, free and united Ireland may also exercise a beneficial influence on British politics, culture and ideas. The ending of partition is a great prize for the British people to campaign for. Such a campaign, in Britain, is the missing piece in the peace process.

Addition to the introduction for the Second Edition, published June 2004

SIX YEARS on, the Good Friday Agreement is still not fully implemented and the crisis remains. Britain has suspended the devolved institutions four times in order to placate unionist politicians, and has cancelled elections. Shadowy elements in the police and intelligence services have manufactured crises as excuses to put the brakes on. The Human Rights Commission is in a mess. The policing system is still not agreed and many human rights abusers remain on duty. The Stevens Report into British security force collusion in murders has still not been published, and the promised public enquiry into the 1989 murder of solicitor Pat Finucane has been postponed yet again. The reason is simple: these inquiries would reveal that the UK that is engaged in a “war on terrorism” has itself engaged in terrorism. The need to campaign for an exit strategy is as great as ever.